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I. Introduction
"I have a Web site I'm working on."[2]
{1} Almost everyone, it sometimes seems, is "working on a Web site." The Internet,[3] a seamless web of
communication, has broken down barriers of distance and time among people. At the same time it has made
increasingly porous the conventional boundaries between the tangible and the abstract. Many business
entities have created their own World Wide Web pages[4] on the Internet, in order to deliver their advertising
messages instantaneously to potential customers anywhere in the world.[5] Increasingly, lawsuits are being
filed against these businesses engaged in electronic commerce.[6]
{2} The Internet's indifference to physical borders is challenging and rapidly reshaping traditional notions of
"presence" within geographical boundaries.[7] As a result, novel questions have begun to arise regarding
personal jurisdiction over defendants in Internet-related cases.
{3} Recent court decisions have demonstrated confusion and division in the judiciary's grappling with
plaintiffs' attempts to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with the forum state[8]
exist primarily, or exclusively, through the defendant's Internet webpage.[9]
{4} Additionally, a website's status as "passive"[10] or "interactive"[11] also presents issues of first
impression in a jurisdictional analysis. However, not all courts give meaningful attention to the difference
between "passive" and "interactive" webpages and their differing capacities to "contact" persons in a
particular forum. The failure to do so has resulted in inconsistent, and sometimes flawed, court rulings.[12]
This article will examine those cases, focusing primarily on two federal district court decisions considering
"passive" webpages -- Inset v. Instruction Set, Inc.[13] and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King.[14]
{5} Inset involved a defendant whose only "contacts" with the forum state were the defendant's maintenance,
for advertising purposes, of a World Wide Web site accessible to persons residing in Connecticut and to
people throughout the world, along with a toll-free telephone number.[15] The Inset court found that the
defendant's website was a sufficient contact to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
Connecticut.[16] As in Inset, the defendant in Bensusan also maintained a "1-800" telephone number along
with a website advertising its jazz club.[17] The court in Bensusan, however, decided that maintenance of a
webpage available to New York residents, without additional activity by the defendant in the forum, did not
rise to the level of "minimum contacts" necessary for a finding of personal jurisdiction comporting with due
process.[18]
{6} The cases of Inset and Bensusan contain strikingly similar factual scenarios, but the courts deciding those
cases nevertheless arrived at different conclusions regarding whether a World Wide Web page is sufficient to
establish "minimum contacts" in a forum.[19] These opinions from the Connecticut and New York Federal
District Courts demonstrate the lack of consistency within the judiciary as it struggles with this factually new
area of the law.
{7} To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant, federal courts apply the law of the
forum state[20], subject to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[21] Due
process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state so that a court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is fair and just.[22] Personal jurisdiction, which limits the forum in
which a plaintiff may sue a defendant on a particular claim,[23] requires that a non-resident defendant have
established a relationship with the forum state sufficient that the defendant may reasonably anticipate being
sued there.[24]
{8} A nonresident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction under either general jurisdiction or
specific jurisdiction.[25] General jurisdiction may be established over a party, regardless of the connection
between the underlying controversy and the forum state, if that party's contacts with the state are sufficiently
"significant" or "systematic and continuous."[26] Specific jurisdiction, however, requires a fact-specific
inquiry as to whether a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with
due process requirements mandating the defendant's "minimum contacts" with the forum state.[27]
{9} The U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington set forth a flexible test for determining
specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant: the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the forum
state such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.[28] In order to reduce the vagueness inherent in the International Shoe standard, the
Supreme Court has since developed a three-part test to help courts apply the "minimum contacts" criteria. In
determining that the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction complies with due process, a court must find
that the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum; that the
cause of action arose out of the defendant's activities in the forum; and that the exercise of jurisdiction is
fundamentally fair.[29] To determine the fundamental fairness of asserting jurisdiction the Court has
established the following five criteria: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the
shared interests the several states have in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.[30]
{10} Parts II and III of this article will analyze the conflicting holdings and rationales in Inset and Bensusan
and the courts' treatment of the Internet as a uniquely interactive vehicle for companies and individuals to
transcend traditional notions of physical "presence." Part IV concludes that, in spite of this electronic
medium's novel mode of communication, the existing legal framework established by the Supreme Court for
personal jurisdiction analyses, when applied by a judiciary knowledgeable as to the Internet's abilities and
limitations, is adequate to address the issues presented in this emerging area of the law.
II. Inset v. Instruction Set, Inc.[31]:
An Expansive View of Jurisdiction
{11} The Inset court's expansive view of Internet-based personal jurisdiction affirms the recognition that
advertising, combined with electronic communications, is able to reach human targets with unprecedented
ease and speed, without the need for traditional physical methods of delivery.[32] This general and
incontrovertible recognition led the court to examine critical questions regarding what constitutes an Internet
advertiser's legal "presence" in a forum when that party's only contact with the forum state involves the
maintenance of a website.[33]
{12} In Inset, the plaintiff Inset Systems Inc. ("Inset") filed a lawsuit against Instruction Set, Inc. ("ISI") in
the Connecticut Federal District Court.[34] A Connecticut corporation with its only office in Brookfield,
Connecticut, Inset develops and sells computer software services around the world.[35] ISI, a Massachusetts
corporation, markets computer technology and support to companies worldwide, and maintains its sole office
in Natick, Massachusetts.[36] ISI has neither employees nor offices in Connecticut, and does not conduct
business in Connecticut on a regular basis.[37]
{13} On August 23, 1985, Inset filed for registration of the federal trademark "INSET."[38] Some time
thereafter, ISI began to use the designation "INSET" as part of its webpage domain name, "INSET.COM",
having created that "passive" webpage in order to advertise its products through the Internet.[39] On June 30,
1995, Inset sued ISI, alleging that ISI's use of "INSET.COM" as its Internet domain name, and its use of the
toll-free number "1-800-US-INSET", infringed upon Inset's federally registered trademark.[40] ISI moved to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction under the Connecticut long-arm
statute and pursuant to the "minimum contacts" requirements of the Due Process Clause.[41]
{14} In examining the jurisdictional issue in Inset, District Court Judge Covello first addressed whether
Connecticut law established the state's personal jurisdiction over ISI.[42] Connecticut's long-arm statute
provides that a foreign corporation is subject to suit within the state on a cause of action arising out of any
business solicited in the state, if the corporation repeatedly solicits business within the forum state.[43]
Considering whether ISI solicited business repeatedly within Connecticut, the court relied on two
Connecticut Federal District Court decisions in which a "repetitious pattern of business" was found sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute, permitting jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.[44]
In one of the cases, the defendant, during a six-month period, had placed at least six advertisements in a
newspaper whose circulation included Connecticut.[45] The statute had similarly been held to be satisfied
where a party had advertised in thirty periodicals with circulation in Connecticut during eighteen months, and
where thirty catalogs were delivered to Connecticut residents and two sales of the allegedly infringing
products to Connecticut residents had occurred, even though the sales may not have been the results of the
solicitation activities.[46]
{15} In comparing ISI's advertising on the Internet to the hard-copy promotional materials utilized by the
defendants in the two instances above, Judge Covello pointed out the relentless nature of electronic
advertising and distinguished it from other kinds of advertising:
[S]ince March, 1995, ISI has been continuously advertising over the Internet, which includes at
least 10,000 access sites in Connecticut. Further, unlike hard-copy advertisements noted in the
above two cases, which are often quickly disposed of and reach a limited number of potential
consumers, Internet advertisements are in electronic printed form so that they can be accessed
again and again by many more potential consumers.[47]
This ISI activity, the court found, clearly constituted solicitation of Connecticut residents of a sufficiently
repetitive nature to confer jurisdiction over ISI under Connecticut's long-arm statute.[48]
{16} Having determined that ISI was subject to Connecticut's long-arm jurisdiction, the court next considered
whether a finding of personal jurisdiction over ISI would violate ISI's due process rights. In asserting
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a court will find due process requirements satisfied only if the
nonresident corporate defendant's "minimum contacts" with the forum state are sufficient that having
"purposefully availed" itself of the benefit of conducting business in the state, the defendant should have
reasonably anticipated being haled into the forum state's court.[49] Additionally, the maintenance of a lawsuit
in the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.[50]
{17} Regarding the question of whether ISI had sufficient "minimum contacts" with Connecticut to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of due process, ISI argued that it lacked sufficient contacts with Connecticut
because it did not conduct business in the state on a regular basis and because it had no offices or employees
in the state.[51] Inset, however, asserted that ISI's webpage and toll-free-number sufficiently established ISI's
conducting of business within Connecticut.[52]
{18} In addressing the crux of the "minimum contacts" test, Judge Covello considered whether ISI acted in
such a manner as to "purposefully avail" itself of the benefits and protections of Connecticut by conducting
business activities within that state.[53] In Connecticut, the court pointed out, the "purposeful availment" test
has been satisfied when a corporation has displayed a pattern of product promotion and sales in Connecticut
by supplying potential customers with catalogs advertised in periodicals circulated in Connecticut, by
providing products ordered by Connecticut residents, and by demonstrating a readiness to solicit Connecticut
customers through telephone communications.[54] Comparing that kind of promotional activity to ISI's
electronic advertising on its Internet webpage, Judge Covello once again focused on the pervasive nature of
ISI's advertising measures and emphasized the differences between website advertisement and other modes of
advertisement:
In the present case, (ISI) has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free
number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states. The Internet as well as toll-free
numbers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state.
Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut
alone. Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the
advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user.[55]
{20} According to Judge Covello, the difference between the Internet and other forms of media advertising is
the Internet's ability to reach customers with advertising information, unconstrained by traditional limitations
of time or space. This difference put the defendant on notice that it could reasonably anticipate being sued in
Connecticut, and thus clearly mandated a finding that ISI "purposefully availed" itself of the benefits of
conducting business in Connecticut.[56]Finally, the court addressed whether a finding of personal jurisdiction
over ISI complied with requirements of fair play and substantial justice.[57] In so doing it considered the
relative burdens on the parties of litigating in each forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, and the interstate judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving controversies.[58] Because the
defendant's place of business was less than two hours from the Hartford, Connecticut federal courthouse and
the defendant had retained Connecticut counsel the burden on the defendant in litigating the matter in
Hartford was minimal. Connecticut, the court found, had an interest in adjudicating issues involving common
and statutory law, and adjudication in Connecticut would resolve the matter efficiently.
{21} Therefore, the court ruled that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over ISI comported with notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court determined that ISI's advertising on the Internet,
through its webpage, established the repeated solicitation of business in Connecticut required by
Connecticut's long-arm statute and also complied with constitutional due process requirements.[59]
{22} In determining that the Internet webpage constituted a sufficiently strong contact with Connecticut to
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Judge Covello manifested an understanding of the world as
a place in which physical presence -- and in many instances personal experience and individual thought -- are
being replaced by a reality determined by potent advertising messages and electronically-natured systems
such as the Internet. In its analysis of whether ISI was subject to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, the
court in Inset noted that ISI's Internet webpage differed from traditional methods of advertising such as
television, radio and newspapers.[60] Judge Covello found particular relevance in two inherent physical
limitations of non-Internet advertising media.
{23} First, television and radio advertising is time-specific because the contact between the medium and the
recipient is not continuous, and thus must occur during pre-scheduled moments.[61] Second, in order to be
received, the hard-copy newspaper or magazine containing the advertisement must be present within the
same physical space as the reader, and must be read before its disposal occurs.[62]
{24} To a degree, the position that the Internet is different from other advertising media, in that it is not
constrained by the physical time and space limitations of traditional vehicles such as newspaper or television,
may seem persuasive.
{25} Indeed, some Internet commentators have gone far beyond Judge Covello in emphasizing the newness
and singularity of this medium. It has been argued that the Internet alters not only the physical aspects of
traditional methods of communication, but more importantly that its interactive capability allows and
encourages individuals to adopt new online identities. This feature results in the creation of multiple "selves,"
unconstrained by the geographical boundaries of a single, corporeal existence.[63]
{26} In Life On The Screen[64], Sherry Turkle argues that the Internet encourages us to re-construct the
"self." In describing this "cultural work in progress"[65] Turkle identifies an emerging sense of "decentered
and multiple" identities as one crosses the boundary from the human to the technological.[66] Consider
Turkle's recounting of how one woman re-creates her identity: the woman forges a personal relationship with
a man she "met" on the Internet, and she is in a state of confused anxiety as she plans her first meeting with
him.
An interior designer nervously admits in my interview with her that she is not at her best because
she is about to have a face-to-face meeting with a man with whom she has shared months of
virtual intimacy in chat sessions on America Online. She says she is "pretty sure" that her
electronic lover is actually a man (rather than a woman pretending to be a man) because she does
not think "he" would have suggested meeting if it were otherwise, but she worries that neither of
them will turn out to be close enough to their very desirable cyberselves: "I" didn't exactly lie to
him about anything specific, but I feel very different online. I am a lot more outgoing, less
inhibited. I would say I feel more like myself. But that's a contradiction. I feel more like who I
wish I was. I'm just hoping that face-to-face I can find a way to spend some time being the
[o]nline me."[67]
{28} The woman has developed an online self that is very real to her. When she is faced with a choice of
which identity to adopt in her actual meeting with the other person, she expresses a preference towards, and
perceives as plausible, her new "self."
{29} Another commentator's account supports the theory that the Internet fosters not only the fragmentation
and multiplicity of identity, but also allows for the emergence of a non-physical self, the Internet creates a
seemingly complete "presence" without the need for a physical component.[68] The following is a
description of a "real life" introduction of persons who had only previously "met" on the Internet:
I remember the first time I walked into a room full of people [in real life] who knew many
intimate details of my history and whose own stories I knew very well. Three months after I
joined, I went to my first WELL[69] party at the home of one of the WELL's [o]nline
moderators. I looked around at the room full of strangers when I walked in. It was one of the
oddest sensations of my life. I had contended with these people, shot the invisible breeze around
the electronic watercooler [sic], shared alliances and formed bonds, fallen off my chair laughing
with them, become livid with anger at some of them. But there wasn't a recognizable face in the
house. I had never seen them before.[70]
{30} These illustrations expose the undeniable power of the Internet to create and deliver a powerful, albeit
non-physical "presence" to anyone, anywhere, at any time. It is this unique aspect of the Internet which
appears to have influenced Judge Covello's assessment of the nature of ISI's "contacts" to Connecticut and its
subsequent establishment of the court's personal jurisdiction over ISI.[71]
{31} Claims that the Internet is totally different from traditional media--that it is changing the meaning of
physical "presence"-- may be too global and overblown. Engaging in a close analysis of the issues presented
in each particular case involving use of an Internet website is important. Such a closer and more satisfactory
examination occurred in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King.[72]
III. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King[73]:
Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction
{32} Bensusan Restaurant Corporation operated "The Blue Note," a New York jazz club.[74] Bensusan sued
Richard King, a Missouri resident and owner of a Missouri jazz club, also known as "The Blue Note."[75]
Bensusan claimed that King's website on the Internet infringed on Bensusan's right in its trademark "The
Blue Note," and asserted claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition.[76]
Bensusan filed the action in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York.[77] King moved to
dismiss the complaint, asserting that his site on the World Wide Web was insufficient for the New York court
to establish personal jurisdiction over him under the New York long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution.[78]
{33} To advertise his club, King established a passive[79] Internet website in April 1996.[80] The website
allegedly contained "a fanciful logo" which Bensusan asserted was substantially similar to his New York
Blue Note logo.[81] King's website contains general information about the club in Missouri, a calendar of
events, and ticket information, including the names and addresses of ticket outlets in Columbia, Missouri for
The Blue Note Club.[82] The site also contains a telephone number for charge-by-phone ticket orders, which
are available for pick-up on the night of the show at The Blue Note box office in Columbia.[83]
{34} Federal District Court Judge Stein first addressed whether personal jurisdiction over King was proper
under Section 302(a)(2) of the New York long-arm statute, which permits a New York court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who commits a tortious act within New York.[84]
{35} In addressing whether copyright infringement, the alleged tortious act, occurred in New York, Judge
Stein examined the process involved in providing the website information to New York consumers.[85] The
court noted that in order for the site visitor to utilize the information advertised on King's website, a visitor
had to actively engage in several procedures.[86] A person had to access the website, then telephone the
Missouri box office to order performance tickets, and finally pick up the tickets in Missouri since King did
not mail tickets to purchasers.[87] Accordingly, the alleged trademark infringement would occur in Missouri,
not New York, since any "confusion"[88] as to the two Blue Note clubs would arise as a result of the acts of
the user in New York.[89] In concluding that the alleged tortious act was not committed in New York, the
court found that King had not actively directed any "infringing activity" towards New York: "The mere fact
that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person
advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York."[90]
{36} Bensusan next attempted to establish that King had transacted business in New York, and thus satisfied
Section 302 (a)(3) of the New York long-arm statute.[91] In order to subject a defendant to personal
jurisdiction under that statutory provision, a plaintiff must show that the defendant derived substantial profits
from its participation in interstate business and that the defendant reasonably expected its tortious act to have
consequences in New York.[92] Bensusan alleged that King participated in interstate commerce by hiring
nationally-known bands and that he could reasonably have foreseen the occurrence of confusion in New York
of the two Blue Note clubs, because King knew that Bensusan's club was located in New York.[93] The court
rejected this argument for two reasons. First, ninety-nine percent of King's revenue came from local residents
of Columbia, Missouri, and the statute required not mere participation by the defendant in interstate
commerce, but that the defendant derive "substantial" revenue from interstate commerce.[94] Additionally,
King's website did not constitute "a discernable effort . . . to serve, directly or indirectly, a market in the
forum state," and thus it was not foreseeable that King's webpage advertising would have consequences in
New York.[95] Lastly, the court did not find that Bensusan had suffered any significant economic injury as a
result of King's webpage activities.[96] Accordingly, Judge Stein found that King's website did not support
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over King under the New York long-arm statute.[97]
{37} Although the court found that jurisdiction was not proper under New York law, it nonetheless addressed
whether asserting personal jurisdiction over King would violate due process.[98] Judge Stein first
acknowledged that due process requires that the non-resident defendant purposefully establish "minimum
contacts" with the forum state such that the "maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."[99] In determining whether a defendant has "minimum contacts" with a forum
state, the court considered the following factors: "1) whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of
the benefits of the forum state; 2) whether the defendant carried on a continuous and systematic part of its
general business within the forum state; and 3) whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state are such that he should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court there."[100]
{38} The court found that King had done nothing to "purposefully avail" himself of the benefits of New
York.[101] In support of the court's position, Judge Stein pointed to the passive nature of King's website:
King, like numerous others, simply created a website and permitted anyone who could find it to
access it. Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide- or even worldwide- but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward
the forum state (emphasis added).[102]
{39} Further, since the maintenance of the website did not establish that King actively sought to encourage
New Yorkers to access this site, the court found that King could not have conducted a "continuous and
systematic" part of its business in New York.[103]
{40} Again, Judge Stein recognized the website's limitations in its ability to establish a "presence" in New
York: "There is in fact no suggestion that King has any presence of any kind in New York other than the
website that can be accessed worldwide."[104] Finally, the court held that even if it was foreseeable to King
that users could access his webpage in New York, and could thus be confused as to the two jazz clubs'
relationship, that by itself was insufficient to satisfy due process.[105] This reasoning led to a finding that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over King violated due process, and the court granted King's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.[106]
{41} The Bensusan court's analysis differs markedly from that of the Inset court. Unlike Judge Covello, in
Bensusan, Judge Stein decided that King's creation of a "passive" website, without more, did not establish
that King had purposefully availed himself of the benefits of conducting business in New York.[107] The
remainder of this article will be devoted to examination of the conflicting rationales of Inset and Bensusan.
IV. "Presence" Through the Internet
{42} The effect of the "presence," which may be established by the "interactivity" possible between the user
and the Internet, should not be underestimated either in legal analysis or in a broader social construction. Bill
Gates, founder and C.E.O. of Microsoft, has enthusiastically acknowledged the "intimate and ongoing"
relationship between individuals made possible through the interactive qualities of the Internet.[108] Mr.
Gates recently expressed his intent to develop a much "deeper" relationship with consumers through the
Internet:
Our relationship to date has been if the people buy a product, which historically was a box,
they'd take it home and use it, and then a few years later they'd get another one. That will change
to where you're connected up to the Internet. We'll ask you to register and . . . we'll upload a few
profile bits about how you're using the applications and what your hardware is . . . .And with the
interactive content you go from contacting us every two years down to contacting us two or three
times a day, where you're saying, 'What are the top stories that I care about . . . ?'[109]
Mr. Gates has additionally described his vision of the future:
The information highway will extend the electronic marketplace and make it the ultimate go-
between, the universal middleman. Often the only humans involved in a transaction will be the
actual buyer and seller . . . .When you want to buy something you'll be able to tell your computer
to find it for you at the best price offered by any acceptable source or ask your computer to
'haggle' with the computers of various sellers . . . .Servers distributed worldwide will accept bids,
resolve offers into completed transactions, control authentication and security, and handle all
other aspects of the marketplace, including the transfer of funds. This will carry us into a new
world of low-friction . . .stores and services that until now have profited just because they are
'there'- in a particular geographic location- may find they have lost that advantage.[110]
{43} Bill Gates' scenarios describe an Internet containing interactive qualities representing a boundary-less
force establishing a "presence" so significant that each day, it will inform us repeatedly of what is "important"
to us, and can actually purchase for us all of the products that we wish to buy. The "deepness" of the
relationship between an interactive Internet and humans thus results in its increased role in our decision-
making as well as in a reduction in the "friction" generally present in our daily lived experience.
{44} It is the notion of a continuous presence created by electronic-based media that seemed to influence
Judge Covello in rendering a finding of personal jurisdiction, based only on a defendant's maintenance of a
"passive" Internet website.[111] In Inset, ISI's webpage had no interactive capabilities.[112] Other than
posting advertising material, ISI could not conduct any additional activity on its website such as transmitting
computer files to consumers, utilizing e-mail to communicate with webpage visitors, or entering into
contracts with customers for the sale of goods or services.[113] The Inset court, however, failed to take into
account the difference between a "passive" and an "interactive" website in its jurisdictional analysis.
{45} The "interactive" website differs substantially from a "passive" website in that it can engage in
communication with potential consumers who are situated in a particular geographic location, and can
establish a pattern of geographically-specific activity through its contacts with those persons.[114] This
scenario allows for the formation of "relationships" between users and the webpage advertiser, with the
potential of establishing the type of conduct which may ultimately constitute sufficient "minimum contacts"
with the forum state.
{46} Judge Covello's opinion in Inset is further flawed as its due process analysis consisted of a conclusory
finding that ISI purposefully availed itself of doing business in Connecticut. This finding was based on ISI's
"continuous" advertisement on its "passive" Internet webpage, without any additional contacts specifically
with Connecticut.[115] As a result, the court concluded, ISI could reasonably have anticipated being haled
into court in Connecticut.[116] The Inset opinion reflects a broad-stroked jurisdictional test applied in a
manner exhibiting an overreaction to the novel factual scenario before the court. The opinion lacked the type
of sensitive fact-based analysis which is necessary in Internet-related jurisdictional issues.
{47} In Bensusan, the court's reliance on Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Ct. of California[117] utilized a jurisdictional analysis well-suited to the determination of whether
Internet-based activities constitute "minimum contacts" with a forum state. In Asahi, a California resident
was injured while riding as a motorcycle passenger, when the vehicle's tire suddenly exploded.[118] The
plaintiff sued Chen Shin Rubber Industrial Co., ("Chen Shin"), a Taiwan manufacturer of components in tire
tubes, and filed the lawsuit in California Superior Court.[119] Chen Shin distributed its product world-wide.
[120] Chen Shin then sought indemnification from Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer of tire tube valve
assemblies who sold the assemblies to Chen Shin.[121]
{48} In Asahi, the Court addressed the issue of whether a non-resident foreign defendant's awareness that the
product it manufactured, sold and delivered outside the United States might reach California in the "stream of
commerce"[122] constituted "minimum contacts" so that exercising personal jurisdiction over that defendant
would be reasonable.[123] The Supreme Court set forth a two-prong analysis which it developed to
determine whether a finding of personal jurisdiction comports with due process: 1) whether the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the laws of the forum state, and 2) whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair and reasonable.[124]
{49} Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi held that a non-resident defendant's placement of a
product into the "stream of commerce,"[125] without additional conduct[126] in the forum state, did not
satisfy the "purposeful availment" prong of the "minimum contacts" analysis.[127] The Court also found that
the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable because of the heavy burden on the Japanese
defendant, Asahi, to litigate in a California court.[128] Additionally, the Court considered the slight interests
of the Taiwan corporation, Cheng Shin, and the State of California in resolving an indemnification claim
between two foreign parties in a California court.[129]
{50} By employing the jurisdictional analysis set forth by O'Connor in Asahi, the Bensusan opinion
illustrates that a sufficiently flexible legal framework exists and should be applied in Internet cases raising
questions of personal jurisdiction.[130] The "additional conduct" requirement to the "stream of commerce"
test, along with a determination of reasonableness, supplies a suitable jurisdictional analysis that asserts
personal jurisdiction over defendants whose Internet activity establishes intentional contacts with forum
residents, and not over conduct providing merely "passive" advertising messages[131] worldwide. One
method of determining whether personal jurisdiction over a defendant who maintains a webpage is proper is
by the examination of the level of interactivity occurring within the website.[132] Two writers on this subject
have suggested an examination of the "hits"[133] to a website, assigning importance or weight to hits
according to their nature or "quality".[134] Application of this test enables a court to find personal
jurisdiction solely based on maintenance of an Internet webpage if those contacts with forum state residents
are sufficiently robust.
{51} In addition to the application of existing jurisdictional analyses to personal jurisdiction issues, it is
important that judges become educated regarding an Internet webpage's interactive capabilities. This
knowledge will aid in minimizing judicial overreaction to Internet-related cases such as that exhibited by
Judge Covello in Inset.[135] One example of a judiciary's education of Internet concepts may be found in the
court's opinion in ACLU v. Reno.[136] In ACLU v. Reno, various organizations brought a constitutional
challenge against the Communications Decency Act of 1996.[137] That Federal Law attempted to regulate
the transmission of indecent or obscene material to children over the Internet.[138] During a preliminary
hearing, Judges Sloviter, Buckwalter and Dalzell obtained familiarity with the Internet through
demonstrations conducted on computers in the courtroom, and learned, among other things, of differences
between Internet communications and those received by radio or television.[139]
{52} The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a personal jurisdiction analysis is an imprecise inquiry, and
that the "minimum contacts" test is not susceptible to "mechanical application."[140] As a result, the
analytical framework provided by the Court in International Shoe,[141] and subsequent Court opinions,[142]
along with Justice O'Connor's "additional contacts" requirement to the "stream of commerce"[143] test in a
"minimum contacts" analysis, is easily adaptable to questions of personal jurisdiction in Internet-related
cases. Thus, courts' application of a jurisdictional framework established by the Court, along with a working
knowledge of what type of "presence" the Internet can, and cannot, establish in a forum state, will ensure
consistent judicial opinions in Internet cases, and foster the development of a uniform and coherent body of
law.
V. Conclusion
{53} As more individuals and businesses develop webpages to advertise their products on the Internet, the
amount of Internet-related litigation will increase proportionately. The Internet's indifference to boundaries,
however, presents novel issues of what constitutes "presence" by a non-resident defendant in a forum state
within the context of a personal jurisdiction analysis. Recent opinions illustrate courts' disagreement and
confusion regarding the interactive capabilities of an Internet webpage to establish "minimum contacts" by
the defendant in a forum state. Increased judicial familiarity with the nature of the Internet, together with the
application of existing yet flexible legal precedent to Internet-related jurisdictional questions will encourage
well-reasoned opinions in this emerging area of the law.
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